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Interracial Intimacy and the 
Potential for Social Change 
 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY:  THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 
by Rachel F. Moran.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.  
271 pp. $ 30.00 cloth. 
 
Reviewed by Stephanie M. Wildman† 
 For those interested in fighting bias and discrimination and in thinking 
about how changes in our legal treatment of race has evolved, Rachel F. 
Moran’s Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance, is 
required reading.  As we examine the historic struggle against bias and dis-
crimination, we perceive issues from the past and often find it surprising that 
these issues could have been contested, let alone decided, as they were.1  
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 proclaiming in 1896 that separate but equal accommo-
dations were constitutional, is often cited as an example of a case that was 
wrong “the day it was decided.”3  I do think Plessy was wrong, but we mod-
ern-day critics have the benefit of hindsight as we view these past decisions.  
How will our decisions of today look from the vantage point of 100 years in 
the future?4  As warriors in the fight against bias and discrimination,  we must 
consider how our actions will fare when viewed in the pages of history.  We 
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1. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1997) (citing the Supreme 
Court’s  assertion in Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) that  “Plessy was 
wrong the day it was decided.”).  See also  Angela P. Harris,  Equality Trouble: Sameness 
and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000) (describing 
U.S. racial history).  
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown , 347 U.S. 483. 
3. Siegel, supra  note 1, at 1112. 
4. Id. at  1146. 
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may take a position, trying to fight discrimination today, that is unpopular, but 
will be vindicated with the passage of time.  
  In 1948 one warrior against bias, Justice Roger Traynor, wrote the 
California Supreme Court decision in Perez v. Lippold .5  Try to imagine the 
world in the 1940s when the petitioners in this case sought to compel the 
county of Los Angeles to issue them a marriage license.  The county refused 
Ms. Perez, a white woman, and Mr. Davis, an African-American man, a li-
cense because of a California Civil Code section prohibiting interracial mar-
riage.6  The petitioners brought their challenge not on equal protection 
grounds, but on grounds of religious freedom.  The 1940s preceded the rise of 
public and judicial consciousness about the equal protection clause and the 
notion of equal treatment which was to become the cornerstone of modern 
civil rights law.   
 In his opinion, Justice Traynor acknowledged the sometimes pernicious 
history of judicial decisions on race.  He wrote:  “Many courts in this country 
have assumed that human beings can be judged by race and that other races 
are inferior to the Caucasian.”7 He also noted that “[t]he effect of race 
prejudice upon any community is unquestionably detrimental both to the mi-
nority that is singled out for discrimination and to the dominant group that 
would perpetuate the prejudice.”8  Justice Traynor understood that the case 
raised an equal protection issue.  He recognized that as a country, we have 
had a history of supporting white supremacy.  He also understood that both 
the victim and perpetrator are hurt by discriminatory beliefs, albeit in different 
ways.  Justice Traynor was truly ahead of his time. 
 The Perez decision held that the California law sections at issue violated 
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution “by impairing the right of 
individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and unrea-
sonably discriminating against certain racial groups.”9  This decision was a 
difficult one for the court, which voted by a bare majority, 4-3, to strike down 
the statutes. Justice Traynor had no guidance from a higher court when he 
cast his deciding vote and authored the opinion.  It was not until 1967, almost 
two decades later, that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide Loving v. Vir-
ginia,10 declaring similar statutes unconstitutional. Yet a different decision by 
the California court would be unthinkable today.   
 We can only imagine what combination of intellect, judicial integrity, and 
sensibility enabled Justice Traynor to be the visionary that he was.  We can 
only wonder what empowered him to provide leadership and the deciding vote 
so that the eyes of history would judge this case as the obvious and correct 
                                                 
5. 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948). 
6. Cal. Civ. Code §§60, 69 (1933). 
7. Perez, 32 Cal.2d at 720. 
8. Id. at 725. 
9. Id. at 731-2. 
10. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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decision.  In the pre-Brown v. Board of Education11 era, legalized racial 
segregation was still the norm.  In this period, the dawning of the civil rights 
movement, modern debates about racial justice were just beginning.  It must 
have been difficult for progressive judges to author decisions about racial 
equality when so much of the public still actively endorsed racial segregation.  
Decisions condoning interracial marriage and intimacy, though clearly the 
right decisions in retrospect, must have risked public outcry.  Tackling the 
private sphere certainly must have been difficult in terms of potential public 
resistance.  Judges who made such decisions must have realized the profound 
connection between private intimate relationships and the goal of wider social 
and legal   equality. 
 Much writing about racial bias and discrimination continues to focus on 
the public sphere, where policy debates affect education, voting, housing, and 
employment.  Feminist scholars have long recognized the poverty of this pub-
lic/private distinction, because the personal is political.12  In her penetrating 
and well-researched book, Moran examines the so-called private landscape of 
race in the context of interracial intimacy.  She urges the connection between 
our personal, private views of race and racial issues and the policy decisions 
society makes in the public realm. Moran notes that the colorblind rhetoric 
that finds increasing popularity in the “public debate” about race contrasts 
sharply with the accepted color consciousness that accompanies decisions 
about intimacy and love in the “private sphere.”  The fusion of these public 
and private worlds demonstrates the need for more thoughtful analysis on 
racial issues.  Moran’s insights are critically important to a democracy based 
on diversity. 
 One common thread throughout the book, initially exposed by Moran’s 
examination of antimiscegenation ideology, is that the law hisorically has pre-
served white privilege by regulating intimate relationships.  Whites were 
stripped of white racial privilege following intimacy with African Americans. 
(p. 20)  Antimiscegenation laws served to reinforce a system of white racial 
superiority.  The power to ignore this systematic privileging of whiteness and 
to ignore whiteness as a race in discussions of race marks an important char-
acteristic of white racial privilege.13 
 This privileging of whiteness continues even as modern demographics 
suggest that racial debates must no longer be conducted in black-white terms 
as the United States becomes a nation of minorities.  As John Calmore has 
                                                 
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
12. See generally Martha A. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y, & L. 13 (1999); Mar-
tha Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 89 (1998); Frances Olsen, The Family & The Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform , 96 HARV.  L. REV. 1497 (1983); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of 
Rights and Politics:  Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 
(1986). 
13. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBU TIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, 
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & T RINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED:  HOW INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 20 (1996). 
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explained, “the new demography could represent a complex development 
wherein new people of color will consolidate white rule over black.  At the 
heart of that assumption is the idea that to be like white is important, of 
course, but not as important as to be unlike black.”14  The root of this push “to 
be unlike black” begins with antimiscegenation laws and the regulation of in-
terracial intimacy. 
 In the first part of the book, Moran establishes the importance of her 
subject, explaining that race and the meaning of race have been contested 
throughout American history. (p. 3-4)  We live in an era where noticing race 
remains an issue fraught with political tension.  Does the mere act of noticing 
race equate with racism?  If we fail to notice race, how can we end the ef-
fects of segregation that still remain in our schools, colleges, and other institu-
tions that are essential to ensuring the population participates in democratic 
government? 
 By turning the lens to interracial intimacy, Moran brings a fresh per-
spective to these questions.  Rather than focusing on the arena of public life, 
where battles about race are usually waged, the lens of interracial intimacy 
provides insights into this public dimension through an exploration of private 
relationships.  As Moran observes in the first chapter: “[D]ilemmas of inter-
racial intimacy demonstrate that the freedom to marry and build families is not 
independent of race but instead is integral to defining it.” (p. 15)  Moran ex-
amines interracial intimacy in the context of heterosexual partner relation-
ships, particularly marriage, and in the area of placement of children in 
families through custody and adoption.  These examples of “love across the 
color line” (p. 16) help us to investigate the meaning of race and racial equal-
ity. 
 After introducing her central project, Moran explores historic antimisce-
genation laws in relation to the major racialized groups.  Antimiscegenation 
typically conjures images of black-white sex and marriage, where, particularly 
in the South, these laws had their longest history. (p. 17)  But antimiscegena-
tion laws and sentiment also applied to Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and other 
Asians in the United States.  As Moran explains, antimiscegenation laws 
“served different functions at different times for different groups.” (p. 39) 
 Chapter Three explores the “central significance of race” (p. 43) in 
daily life, describing the different role race played in the lives of racialized 
groups.  While African Americans could only achieve white status through 
the phenomenon of passing (pp. 43-48), Native Americans and Latinos could 
assimilate as whites.  Antimiscegenation law in Virginia contained the “Po-
chahontas exception,” allowing those with Native American blood to be 
classified as white. (p. 49)  Native Americans and Mexicans “could use their 
social ties to whites to identify their offspring as white.” (p. 52)  The Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided that Mexican citizens in the territories an-
                                                 
14. John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multirac-
ing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (2001). 
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nexed by the United States would “enjoy the full privileges of American citi-
zenship” at least as a matter of formal law. (p. 56)  This formal promise led 
to racial confusion as racial boundaries blurred. (pp. 56-59) 
 Chapter Four considers the role of antimiscegenation laws in establish-
ing societal norms in sexual and marital customs.  In addition to reinforcing 
white racial superiority, antimiscegenation laws placed “middle-class aspira-
tions for love and marriage at the pinnacle of respectability.” (p. 75)  This 
respectability valued the white, heterosexual nuclear family.  The resulting 
increased pressure for assimilation denied the value of alternative cultural 
practices relating to sex, marriage, and child rearing, such as cohabitation and 
kinship network support.  Antimiscegenation laws resulted in differential im-
pact on the major racialized groups with respect to the construction and de-
struction of their families. (p. 75) 
 In Chapter Five, the heart of the book for those interested in the change 
in law and its implication for societal practice, Moran describes the series of 
antimiscegenation decisions that led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous de-
cision, Loving v. Virginia.15  Here Moran introduces Perez v. Lippold ,16 
Justice Traynor’s landmark opinion and “the first and only state high court 
[decision] since Reconstruction to declare a ban on interracial marriage un-
constitutional.” (p. 84)  Moran describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s reticence 
to address antimiscegenation statutory reform, from denials of certiorari (pp. 
89-90) through recasting the issue as one of racial equality in the criminal jus-
tice system. (pp. 93-94)  Through the evolution of these cases, the Court be-
came the reluctant champion of legal change with Loving.   
 The Court relied upon “principles of both liberty and equality in striking 
down the statute.” (p. 98)  The majority characterized the racial classifica-
tions made by the statute as “measures designed to maintain white suprem-
acy.” Id.  It is worth noting the Supreme Court’s historic first use of the 
phrase “white supremacy” in the text of the Loving opinion.17   Thus it was in 
the so-called private context of interracial intimacy that the Court spoke with 
the boldest truth, naming the maintenance of white supremacy as the evil re-
sult of segregationist practice that noticed race.  The Court did not deplore all 
racial classification, but rather its use in this harmful context, where the cus-
tom of noticing race violated the nation’s most sacred democratic principles.   
 As Moran notes, before the Loving decision, choice of a marital partner 
was dictated by laws on race.  Moran continues by exploring race and ro-
manticism in the post-Loving era, detailing the persistence of same-race mar-
riage even after the legal ban on interracial relationships was lifted.  
Heterosexual marriage thus remains an area where noticing race and making 
racialized choices is an accepted practice, under the guise of romanticism and 
                                                 
15. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
16. 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948).  See also  supra  text accompanying notes 5-9. 
17. 388 U.S. at 7, 11. 
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personal choice.18  In contrast, in the public sphere, increasingly, pressures to 
be colorblind and not to notice race have predominated.19 
 Moran explains how racial intermarriage is usually explained by excep-
tionalism and exoticism. (p. 114)20   She observes: 
The most striking feature of the aftermath of Loving v. Virginia is how readily 
people have accepted segregation in marriage, so long as it is not officially 
mandated.  Despite compelling evidence that race continues to matter in affairs 
of the heart, Americans embrace a colorblind ideal.  Same-race marriages are not 
considered evidence of racism, nor are they seen as a barrier to racial equality. 
(p. 124) 
This comment highlights the importance of Moran’s work.  The powerful 
ideal of colorblindness underlies any contemporary discussion of race.  Moran 
shows that in our most intimate choices we do not act as though we are co-
lorblind.  Yet the connection between that racialized selection and public sec-
tor policy choices is ignored by decisionmakers.  Moran urges them to make 
that connection, since our intimate lives form the basis for our experience of 
the world. 
 The idea that the Constitution is colorblind hearkens back to Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the case that elevated “separate but 
equal” accommodations to a legal principle.21  Harlan stated, “Our constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”22   However, the 
preceding passage from his famous dissent is rarely quoted.  Harlan prefaced 
his colorblind assertion with these words: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it 
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power.  So, I 
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage 
. . . .23  
This passage illustrates the poverty of colorblindness as a racial mantra.24  
Even its most-cited proponent supported the idea of white racial privilege.  
                                                 
18. Reva Siegel names the phenomenon that perpetuates racial hierarchies, even while society 
undergoes change, “preservation through transformation.” Siegel, supra  note 1, at 1113. 
19. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action:  Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1312, 1318 (1986) (describing affirmative action as social engineering or, in reality, a 
quota system, that is a “result -oriented conception of racial justice [that] is both destructive 
of true racial equality and potentially harmful to society.”).  
20. See generally Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment:  
Where the Model Minority Meets Suzi Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (dis-
cussing how race and gender stereotypes of Asian Pacific American women as submissive 
may converge, making them targets for racialized sexual harassment by white men who 
may be titillated by such stereotypes). 
21. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
22. Id. at 556. 
23. Id. at 559. 
24. On the poverty of colorblindness, see also  Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is 
Color-blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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The fact that citation to this white racial superiority passage is rarely made to 
accompany advocacy in support of the colorblind ideal demonstrates the con-
tinued lack of recognition of the white privilege dynamic in racial discourse.25   
 At this point the book shifts emphasis from romantic love to familial 
love, exploring the role of race in custody and adoption decisions.  The rele-
vance of race to child placement determinations has been “hotly debated.” (p. 
127)  Policy inconsistencies, again with different treatment for racialized 
groups, have emerged.  For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 
preserves tribal leaders’ desires to keep Indian children in the tribal commu-
nity and confers “jurisdiction on tribal courts to decide placement cases in-
volving Indian children.”  (p. 135)  The Act’s passage responded to child 
welfare authorities’ disproportionate removal of Indian children from their 
families. Id.  Although ICWA and the parameters of its application remain 
contested, the mere existence of the Act demonstrates that policy makers do 
not consistently embrace notions of colorblindness. 
 One U.S. Supreme Court decision specifically acknowledged that a 
child’s life within an interracial family might in fact be detrimental to the 
child’s best interests precisely because we live in a world where people are 
not colorblind.26  The case involved the placement of a child following di-
vorce.  The child’s white father sued to take custody away from the child’s 
white mother because the mother was living with a Black man. When revers-
ing the Florida state court decisions awarding custody to the father, Chief Jus-
tice Burger, speaking for the Court, wrote, “private biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”27 
As this chapter shows, “simplistic norms of either colorblindness or color con-
sciousness”         (p. 152) do not offer answers for child placement decisions.  
Societal segregation is a reality, even as some families seek to transcend the 
color line. 
 Moran continues to examine the intersection of families and romantic 
love through the lens of race, considering the relation of race and identity in 
the context of the movement toward a new multiracialism.  Some have urged 
intermarriage as a solution to racial problems. (p. 171-72)  For example, Ward 
Connerly, architect of California’s ban on affirmative action, said, “[i]n 10 to 
15 years, inter-marriage will make this entire debate [over racial and ethnic 
preferences] a moot one.” (p. 171)  Moran, however, disagrees, and in some 
of her most articulate and passionate prose criticizes the marital melting pot 
solution as “misplaced optimism and dangerous complacency.” (p. 178)  As 
Moran’s book explains, the option of intermarriage is not equally available to 
                                                 
25. See WILDMAN, supra note 13 at 87.  For further elaboration of privilege, see generally 
RUTH FRANKENBERG ,  WHITE WOMEN,  RACE MATTERS:  THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITENESS (1993); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See.”  White Race Conscious-
ness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH . L. REV. 953 (1993); Martha 
R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA.  L.  REV. 1659 
(1995). 
26. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
27. Id. 
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all racialized groups.  Blacks have the least “opportunity,” if one believes in-
termarriage is a positive racial policy event, to avail themselves of the chance.
 Considering, in the final chapter, the lessons of interracial intimacy, 
Moran acknowledges that “[i]nterracial relationships today are more widely 
accepted . . . [b]ut they remain anomalous and in need of explanation.” (p. 
179)  “When 95 percent of all marriages in America take place between peo-
ple of the same race, race shapes marital choice; but just as importantly, mar-
riage shapes racial identity . . . .  The freedom to select our intimates is also 
the power to define racial difference.” (p. 191)  While the government can no 
longer dictate personal choices about our closest relationships, we make those 
personal choices in the context of segregated residential, educational, and 
employment environments.  The end to government regulation of interracial 
marriage has not resulted in an integrated society; racial segregation remains 
the reality in most of our private lives.    
 As Moran notes, “[z]oning policy, home loan programs, integration of 
schools, and affirmative action in workplaces—all of these can help individu-
als to rethink their assumptions about a good place to live, good working con-
ditions, and a quality learning environment.” (p. 194)  We all continue to make 
racialized choices in our daily lives.   Moran concludes, fittingly, with an ex-
hortation for us all to act affirmatively to undo societal segregation and re-
make our notion of race.  The segregated status quo, though no longer legally 
mandated, will govern racial views and reinforce societal segregation.  Thus 
she urges:  “We can undo race before it undoes us.” (p. 196) 
 Undoing race necessarily involves undoing the system of white racial 
privileging embodied in the antimiscegenation laws that regulated interracial 
intimacy, as well as systems of privilege based on gender and sexual orienta-
tion.  The strength of Moran’s exploration of interracial intimacy lies in its 
illumination of the part of race privileging that usually remains veiled as pri-
vate conduct.  Yet, as Moran compellingly shows, the “private” implicates 
public policy. 
 While her book does not explore explicitly interracial intimacy in the 
context of same-sex relationships, Moran’s compelling coverage of hetero-
sexual interracial intimacy highlights the absences and the silences that mark 
interracial gay and lesbian relationships.  Interracial gay and lesbian relation-
ships represent another area usually viewed as a private one, yet societal im-
plications stem from the so-called private landscape.  Given the taboos long 
associated with interracial intimacy that Moran describes and the lack of legal 
sanction granted to gay and lesbian relationships, it is not surprising that this 
topic appears invisible in legal literature.  As Mary Becker notes: 
In only three states, Hawaii, Alaska, and most recently, Vermont, have judges 
been able to imagine same-sex marriage . . . .  In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii held that the denial of a marriage license to lesbian and gay 
couples violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the Hawaiian Constitution.  
The court reasoned that if a statute banning interracial marriage discriminated 
on the basis of race, as  the United States Supreme Court had held in Loving v. 
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Virginia, then a statute banning same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis 
of sex in violation of the provision against sex discrimination in the Hawaiian 
Constitution.28 
A number of articles have examined the analogical reasoning exemplified by 
the Baehr court.  These scholars consider whether this reasoning, urging par-
allels between equal protection as used in Loving and the prohibition against 
same-sex marriage, helps the debate about legitimating gay and lesbian inti-
macy, and scholars critique the use of analogies in this setting.29 
 Legal scholars have noted the tendency to assume whiteness as a race 
for gays and lesbians, rendering lesbians and gay men of color invisible.  This 
whiteness presumption impedes the deconstruction of racial meaning neces-
sary to advancing equality.  Darren Hutchinson explains: 
[P]ro- and anti-gay discourses and antiracist theory collectively contribute to a 
white-normative construction of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered iden-
tity—a narrow, racialized construct that hinders gay and lesbian equality ef-
forts. . . . [L]aw and sexuality scholars should adopt a multidimensional lens to 
analyze sexual subordination claims and to portray gay and lesbian experience.  
A multidimensional analysis of heterosexism and homophobia—one that exa m-
ines the various racial, class, gender, and other dimensions of gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgendered identity and the diverse effects of heterosexism—
can destabilize the "gay as white and privileged" stereotype.30  
                                                 
28. Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage:  
Two are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001). See also  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (stating that the right to same sex marriage is not “so rooted in 
the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would vio-
late the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (creating domestic part -
nerships to provide same-sex couples with common benefits equivalent to those enjoyed by 
married couples, but still not permitting same-sex marriage).  Preceding both Baker and 
Baehr, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to view the issue of same-sex relationships in light of 
criminal activity, rather than as an issue of privacy and fundamental rights.  Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy stat -
ute).   
29. Becker, supra  note 27, at 3-4.  See also  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction 
of the Closet:  American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
1007 (1997) (paralleling the development of anti-homosexual mores to tacit acceptance of 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis 
“ Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of 
Subordination, 6 MICH . J. RACE & L. 285 (2001) (criticizing the use of analogy as essen-
tialist); Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal 
Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (1994) 
(identifying the steps of progress under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and arguing 
that Blacks have progressed more rapidly than women through those steps); Sharon Eliza-
beth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies—Identity and “Passing”: Race and Sexual Orienta-
tion, 13 HARV.  BLACKLETTER L.J. 65 (1997) (considering the importance and dangers of 
using analogy). 
30. Darren Lenard Hutchinson,  “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and 
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1361 (2000).  See also  Devon W. 
Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1474 (2000) (The 
idea “that homosexuality is something that white people ‘do’ [and something that Black 
people should not ‘do’] has been circulated and reified in black communities at least since 
the 1960s.”).  See also , Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity:  Cosynthesis and Praxis, 
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 Furthermore, the failure to use a multidimensional perspective, a per-
spective that resists essentializing identity categories, renders invisible the 
daily choices we make to sustain systems of subordination.  As Devon Car-
bado observes: 
All of us make choices every day that legitimize certain discriminatory practices. 
. . . Many of us get married and/or attend weddings, even as lesbian and gay 
marriages are not legally recognized. Others of us have racially monolithic so-
cial encounters, live in de facto white only (or predominantly white) neighbor-
hoods, or send our kids to white only (or predominantly white) schools. Still 
others of us have "straight only" associations—that is, our friends are all het-
erosexuals and our children's friends all have mommies and daddies. These 
choices are not just personal; they are political. And the cumulative effect of 
these micro-political choices is the entrenchment of the very social practices—
racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia—we profess to abhor. 31 
The politically cumulative effect of these choices is an important thesis in 
Moran’s book as well, although not addressed with regard to sexual orienta-
tion. 
 Nevertheless, Interracial Intimacy serves as a powerful reminder of 
the force of categories and the categorical thinking that makes our brains es-
sentialize.  Our minds need categories in order to think,32 so we think of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, and wealth as defining.33 But, as important schol-
arship on subordination has emphasized, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive.34  So when the topic is interracial intimacy, it is important to re-
member that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered interracial relationships 
will add another dimension of understanding to the dynamic of change.35   
 Insights from gay and lesbian relationships across racial lines can con-
tribute to an understanding and ending of subordinating social practices.  As 
Dorain Leslie and Lauren Mac Neill observe: 
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Lesbians in interracial relationships challenge and confront racism in them-
selves and in the other, in perhaps more active, overt ways than those in same-
race relationships. . . . Lesbians in interracial relationships confront differences 
in culture and values in areas such as the role of family, the role of the individ-
ual, money and economic issues, food, religion, childrearing behavior, and ho-
mosexuality.  Recognition of the differences is essential.  Sometimes the couple 
will find that the differences are destructive or divisive; other times, the part-
ners will find them strengthening and enriching.36 
The micro-political choice to fail to see interracial gay and lesbian relations 
contributes to the cumulative invisibility of gay and lesbian relations, generally 
and the racing of these relationships as white.  Interestingly, three of the cou-
ples in Baehr v. Lewin, the historic Hawaii case interpreting the state’s mar-
riage law to allow gay and lesbian relations were mixed racially.37  Yet the 
opinion does not mention that fact and news coverage has been scarce.  In 
the modern political context that supports colorblindness, the automatic reac-
tion seems to be that noticing race is bad.  Yet, as Moran teaches, the failure 
to notice race and to observe that most intimate choices are made on same-
race lines does not serve equality goals.  Roger Traynor understood that it 
was not the act of noticing race, but rather its use to perpetuate white su-
premacy, that was the constitutionally objectionable practice.  Noticing race 
and other identity categories can promote the education of all citizens for the 
practice of democracy.  Noticing race need not equate with using race for the 
purpose of subordination.  Noticing race across these identity categories is 
necessary to dismantle the systems of privilege that led to the world where 
interracial intimacy was prohibited. 
 With Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance, 
Rachel F. Moran makes an meaningful contribution to the literature on race 
and races in the United States and confirms her place as a significant scholar 
in contemporary America.   Interracial Intimacy is an interesting and conse-
quential book on several levels.  A major strength of the book lies in its rec-
ognition that the role of race as to the major racialized groups has not been 
uniform, but rather has been historic, contingent, and evolving.38  The book’s 
exposition of the role that the so-called personal sphere plays in the determi-
nation of public policy is another significant contribution.  Most importantly, it 
is a book about social change.  From rigid rules prohibiting marriage across 
the color line, the human spirit has evolved so that those marriages are no 
longer prohibited.  Perhaps the next evolution will accept marriages and part-
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nerships that transcend gendered heterosexual boundaries.  Moran’s book 
gives cause for optimism that while systems of privilege do exist and the 
status quo perpetuates subordination, real social change can and has occurred 
in the sphere of interracial intimacy. 
 
